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Abstract
Based on new quarterly estimates of the general rate of prot over 1960-
2016, this paper shows that the South African economy experienced two
phase changes in the pace and rhythm of capital accumulation. The rate of
prot exhibits a cyclical tendency to fall, mainly driven by the tendency of
capital intensity to rise. The economy experienced a crisis of absolute over-
production of capital in the mid-1980s. This crisis was not only characterised
by stagnation in the mass of prots, it was also characterised by a halt in
capital accumulation. Thereafter, the rate of prot recovered primarily be-
cause of the fall in the capital-output ratio but it failed to reach the levels
seen in the 1970s. We estimate that in 2012, the South African economy en-
tered a new and on-going crisis of overproduction of capital characterised by
stagnant prots and prolonged overaccumulation, which makes it impossible
for economic growth to recover.
Keywords: falling rate of prot, capital intensity, overproduction of capital,
overaccumulation.
JEL Codes: B5, E11, O5
1. Introduction
This paper develops a protability-based framework to analyse phase changes
of the South African economy. The South African economy is characterised
by high levels of unemployment, income and wealth inequality and poverty.
Estimates provided by Terreblanche (2001) show that in 1970 the expanded
unemployment rate in South Africa was 20.2% and by 2000 it had increased
to 45.8%. As of 2015, the expanded unemployment rate stood at 33.8%.
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In terms of income inequality, Terreblanche also reports that in 1975 the
poorest 40% of the households, accounted for 5.2% of total income. In
2001 the poorest 40% accounted for 3.3% of total national income. Over the
same period, the top 19% of households experienced an increase in their na-
tional income share from 70.9% to 72.2%. These challenges can be traced to
centuries-old institutions that systematically oppressed and super-exploited
South Africas African majority. These institutions were an integral part of
the historical trajectory of South African capitalism, its phases and rhythms
of accumulation.
In many respects, the patterns of development that characterised South
African capitalism under apartheid continue to be reproduced under con-
ditions of democracy. The dominant perspective in South Africa is that the
historical challenges that have been inherited from the apartheid period can
be resolved within the framework of capitalism. However, one of the key
factors that determines the ability of capitalism to deliver social progress is
the trajectory of capital accumulation. Tsouldis and Tsaliki (2014) point
out that the evolution of the rate of prot "determines the general health
and vitalityof the system and denes the stage of accumulation as expand-
ing or contracting" and it "determines the rhythm of capital accumulation".
Therefore, without understanding the evolution and the dynamics of the rate
of prot, it would be di¢ cult to understand the reasons behind the persis-
tently high unemployment and the poor growth outcomes that characterise
the South African economy. In addition, as noted by Duménil and Lévy
(1993:314), the behaviour of the rate of prot is also the prime engine be-
hind the major historical institutional changes that characterise capitalist
economies.
Very few studies exist that examine the rate of prot in South Africa and to
analytically and empirically link the rate of prot to the rate of capital accu-
mulation. Nattrass (1989, 2014) appear to be the only studies that conduct
an analysis of South African protability. However Nattrass (2014) conducts
her study for the period 1960-1989, which is clearly dated. A related study is
Heinz (2002), which investigates the impact of political and economic institu-
tions on capital accumulation. Both these authors conclude by stating that
a protability-based approach to understanding the path of South African
capitalist accumulation is problematic. According to Nattrass (2014) the
prot-based approach has limitations, whereas Heinz (2002) says that it is
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misleading. As if anticipating the statement by Tsouldis and Tsaliki (2014),
Nattrass in particular says there are "limitations to using trends in wages,
productivity and protability as indicators of the health of capitalism".
Contrary to these conclusions, this paper argues that the protability-based
provides a more sound explanation of the phases and rhythms of capital ac-
cumulation in South Africa. Indeed, at a fundamental level of analysis, it
may be argued that it is the neglect by policymakers of the role played by
the rate of prot in the capitalist mode of production which explains the
numerous disappointing growth and unemployment outcomes which system-
atically deviated from the publicly announced targets. For instance in 1996
South African policymakers adopted a macroeconomic framework called the
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in which they targeted
an average growth rate of 4.2% over the period 19962000, but the actual
growth rate was 2.5% (Streak, 2004). The next programme was adopted in
2006, called the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (AS-
GISA). It targeted a growth rate of 6% between 20102014. However the
economy grew on average by 2.5%. In 2012 the government adopted the
National Development Plan (Vision 2030), and set a growth target of 5.4%
over the period 2012-2020. So far the economy is on average hovering below
2% and teetering on the brink of a recession.
It is clear that the analytical framework that South African policymakers
use to set targets for policy is not capable of detecting the actual pace and
rhythm of capital accumulation. The contribution of this paper is to formu-
late a prot-based approach to analyse these phases and rhythms of capital
accumulation in South Africa. In relation to existing literature, our approach
builds on the one rst put forward by Grossman (1992), and later elaborated
by Shaikh (1992) and Tsouldis and Tsaliki (2016). These authors assume
that the rate of prot tends to fall at a certain rate until it hits a point where
the mass of prots are stagnant. At this point, according to Marx (Capital
III: 251), there is a crisis of overproduction of capital. In his framework,
Shaikh proceeds from the general classical political economy view that the
rate of capital accumulation is proportional to the rate of prot. He then
posits that private investment equals capitalist savings from prots. We ex-
tend Shaikhs approach in that we derive a time-varying rate of prot at
which there is overproduction of capital by fully specifying the macroeco-
nomic balance. This extension provides a natural way through which the
3
e¤ects of macroeconomic policies on the course of capital accumulation can
be evaluated.
Empirically, the paper contributes to the very limited Marxist literature on
the South African economy and it contributes to the growing empirical lit-
erature that extends Marxist analysis to emerging markets. Attempts at a
South African protability analysis by Nattrass (2014) rely on data ending in
1989. The second empirical contribution is that we present new estimates of
the quarterly xed capital stock which cover the period 1960-2016, based on
the perpetual inventory method proposed by Shaikh (2016: 847). We then
use these estimates to calculate the quarterly rate of prot. The resultant
quarterly rate of prot exhibits a tendency to fall, in a manner articulated by
Marx in Capital III Part III. The main driver of the fall in the rate of prot is
the increase of capital intensity of production. This nding is consistent with
the results from recent empirical Marxist research on a number of economies
(e.g. Maniatis and Passas (2013) for Greece and Marquetti et al.(2010) for
the case of Brazil). Further analysis also reveals that over the sample period,
the South African economy experienced two phases of crisis.
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 outlines the theoretical frame-
work that we use to analyse the dynamics of the rate of prot and to de-
termine the phases of capital accumulation, section 3 presents the empirical
method of calculating the quarterly xed capital stock and analyses the pat-
tern of the rate of prot, section 4 provides econometric evidence and derives
a time-varying threshold for the rate of prot below which the economy ex-
periences a crisis and identies the phases of capital accumulation in South
Africa, section 5 discusses possible policy interventions during the crisis and
their limitations, and section 6 is the conclusion.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 The dynamics of capitalist accumulation
Before outlining the theoretical framework, it is important to explain three
crucial rates of prot that are at the centre of our analysis. The rst rate
of prot, which we call the critical rate of prot, traces points at which
the capital-output ratio or capital intensity, is constant. Once the actual
rate of prot hits this critical rate from above, capital intensity stops rising.
The second rate of prot corresponds to the point where the rate of capital
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accumulation is zero, i.e. once the actual rate of prot hits this crisis rate
from above, capital accumulation comes to a halt. Such rate of prot traces
points at which the economy enters a crisis of the rst type, i.e. it is a crisis
where the capital stock is stagnant. The third rate of prot traces points
which correspond to what we call the crisis of the second type, i.e. the point
where the mass of prots is stagnant. It is the second type of crisis that
is the subject of most recent Marxist empirical literature, beginning with
Shaikh (1992).
What follows is a systematic derivation of these rates of prot, which we will
later compare with the actual rate and through such comparisons, explain the
phases of capitalist accumulation. The starting point of our analysis is the
macroeconomic balance, which states that gross capital formation is nanced
by private savings, public sector savings and the balance on the current
account (see Mariolis, 2014). We therefore write gross capital formation as
follows:

K + K = S + (T  G) + (Z  X) ; (1)
where  is the rate of depreciation, S is aggregate savings, (T  G) is the
governments primary budget balance with T denoting taxes and G denoting
government spending, (Z  X) is the trade balance with Z denoting imports
and X exports. Dividing both sides by K; we obtain the following equation:

K
K
=   + scr + sg   x; (2)
where sc is the savings propensity of capitalists, r is the rate of prot, sg
is the the ratio of the budget surplus to the capital stock, and x is the net
exports-capital ratio. For simplicity we have assumed that workers do not
save. Furthermore, eq.(2) can be viewed as the extended version of capital
accumulation hypothesised in Shaikh (1992) and Tsouldis and Tsaliki (2014)
in that it explicitly species the government budget balance and the balance
on the current account. We further assume that the level of output depends
on the level of the capital stock and the state of technology. Therefore the
growth rate of output is:
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
Y
Y
=  + 

K
K
; (3)
where Y denotes gross value added,  is represents the "durable" rate of
technical progress and 0 <  < 1 is the elasticity of output with respect
to changes in the capital stock. Marxs theory of capitalist accumulation is
premised on the observation that in the capitalist mode of production, cap-
ital accumulation drives the increase in the organic composition of capital.
According to Marx (Capital I, 589), "the accumulation of capital, though
originally appearing as its quantitative extension only, is e¤ected, as we have
seen, under a progressive qualitative change in its composition, under a con-
stant increase of its constant, at the expense of its variable constituent".
This qualitative change in the composition of capital leads to a progressive
increase in the capital intensity of production. Accordingly, we write the
growth rate of capital intensity as follows:

V
V
= 

K
K
  ; (4)
where V is the capital-output ratio,  = (1  ) > 0 and   0. Eq.(4) says
that there is a critical rate of capital accumulation, given by 

, beyond which
capital intensity will rise and below which it will fall. In the extreme case
where  = 0, capital intensity will rise as long as the rate of capital accumula-
tion is positive. Therefore, the lower is this critical rate of accumulation, the
more the tendency of capital intensity to rise will take e¤ect. By inserting
eq.(2) into eq.(4), we now write the growth rate of the capital-output ratio
as:

V
V
= scr   ( + )   (x  sg) ; (5)
Eq.(5) states that the rate of prot positively a¤ects the growth rate of
capital intensity. Furthermore, austerity measures, which raise sg will raise
the capital-output ratio and thereby put doward pressure on the rate of
prot. A surplus on the current account will slow down the increase in the
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capital-output ratio and therefore put upward pressure on the rate of prot.
Now, the rate of prot above which capital intensity is increasing and below
which it is decreasing is:
rc =

sc
+

sc
+
(x  sg)
sc
(6)
We refer to this rate of prot as the "critical" rate of prot. Note that since
according to Marx the tendency of the rate of prot to fall corresponds to the
tendency of capital intensity to rise, it should be the case that, by the time the
rate of prot reaches rc, the capitalist economy should already be in a crisis of
overproduction of capital. Otherwise, the capitalist economy will never reach
this crisis point, since capital intensity would fall, thereby raising the rate of
prot. Therefore any development that raises rc will mute the tendency of
the rate of prot to fall by preventing capital intensity from rising. The policy
implications are clear from eq.(6). Austerity measures, which are aimed at
increasing sg, will decrease rc thereby facilitating a further increase in capital
intensity. Austerity measures therefore tend to put downward pressure on
the rate of prot. A surplus on the current account will raise rc thereby
preventing an increase in capital intensity.
2.2 The crisis of absolute overproduction of capital
Marx provides two denitions of the crisis of overproduction of capital. Re-
garding the rst type of crisis he states: "There would be absolute over-
production of capital as soon as additional capital for purposes of capitalist
production=0" (Capital III: 251). By this denition, absolute overproduc-
tion of capital occurs when capitalist accumulation grinds to an absolute
halt. In the second type of crisis, the crisis of absolute overproduction of
capital occurs when additional capital "produced just as much, or even less,
surplus value than it did before its increase" (Capital III: 251). To determine
the point of absolute overproduction of capital of the rst type we set

K = 0
in eq.(2). This yields the following crisis rate of prot:
r =

sc
+

x  sg
sc

; (7)
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To determine the point of absolute overproduction of capital of the second
type, recall that we can write aggregate prots as the product of the prot
share and gross value added. Therefore we write the growth rate of the mass
of prots as follows:



=



+  + 

K
K
; (8)
where  is the mass of prots and  is the prot share. Now, the crisis
of overproduction of capital is reached when

 = 0. Note that even if the
economy has reached a crisis of the rst type, i.e.

K = 0, the mass of prots
can still continue to rise because of technical progress and the increase in the
prot share. It is therefore perfectly possible for capital accumulation to be
stagnant, which is a crisis of the rst type, while the mass of prots is rising.
Substituting the rate of capital accumulation using eq.(2) we can write the
growth rate of the mass of prots as follows:



=



+     + scr +  (sg   x) : (9)
Since the crisis of overproduction of capital is reached when

 = 0, this
means that the rate of prot that corresponds to the crisis of the second type
is:
r =

sc
  1
sc
 
 +



!
+
(x  sg)
sc
: (10)
Any development that raises r or r brings the crisis point forward. For
example, an increase in government budget decits will hasten the onset of
the crisis by reducing the rate of capital accumulation and hence the growth
rate of the mass of prots. Austerity measures will therefore postpone the
crisis, but they will not resolve it, since capital intensity will rise and the
rate of prot will once again fall. Similarly a surplus on the current account
will raise the crisis rate of prot all else being the same. The suppression of
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the wage below the value of labour power and relative over population would
increase the growth rate of the prot share, which would postpone the onset
of the crisis.
Note that eqs.(10) and (7) imply that, whether r 7 r depends on whether
the prot share is rising or falling su¢ ciently. If the prot share is falling, it
is possible that r < r, in this case the mass of prots becomes stagnant
before the rate of capital accumulation grinds to a halt. Otherwise, if the
prot share is rising or constant then it is possible that r > r, the mass
of prots become stagnant after the rate of capital accumulation grinds to a
halt. Figure 1 illustrates how the economy reaches a point of overproduction
of capital and then transits into an overaccumulation crisis.
Figure 1: The dynamics of overproduction and overaccumulation crisis
In Figure 1 the economy enters a crisis of stagnation in the mass of prots
before capital accumulation grinds to a halt. In this case the term

 +




<
0 at the point where

 = 0, which means that the prot share must be falling
at a rate greater than  in absolute terms. However, since r > r, the
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rate of capital accumulation remains positive. Thus, between time t1 and
t2, the economy experiences an "overaccumulation of capital", since capital
accumulation continues, despite the fall in the mass of prots. An alternative
case is when

 +




> 0. In this case we have r > r, which means that
the mass of prots continues to rise while net investment is zero or even
negative.
It is this alternative case which led Nattrass (2014) to erroneously reject
the protability-based approach when she states: "Despite a real growth in
the net operating surplus of 2.3% p.a., real investment plummeted by 4.1%
p.a. as the economy stagnated...This illustrates the importance of factors
beyond immediate protability in driving the investment decision and the
limitations to using only trends in wages, productivity and protability as
indicators of the health of capitalism". Our argument is that while fac-
tors such as political unrest and conict are conjuncturally important, it is
the underlying rate of prot that explains the path of capital accumulation.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Duménil and Lévy (1993:314), it is the move-
ment of the rate of prot, as it passes through its crisis levels which denes
turning points in the historical development of capitalist economies.
In relation to the dynamics of capital intensity in the phase of crisis, it
is important to note that (rc   r) = sc > 0. This means that capital
intensity will stop rising rst before capital accumulation grings to a halt.
This further implies that the fall in the rate of prot after capital intensity
has stopped rising will come from the decline in the prot share. Also note
that (rc   r) = sc

1

+ 1


+ 1
sc
 



? 0. Thus, if



> 0 capital intensity
will stop rising before the mass of prots becomes stagnant. However if



is
su¢ ciently negative, then the mass of prots will stagnate before the increase
in capital intensity stops.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1 Estimates of the capital stock
Shaikh (2016:243) argues that elements of the rate of prot should be val-
ued at current prices so that the rate of prot does not contain a spurious
relative price ratio (see also Weisskopf, 1979). Therefore as a starting point,
we present two variations of the perpetual inventory method for estimating
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the nominal xed capital stock as an accumulation of past nominal gross
investment. Ths stock-ow accumulation rule is as follows:
P kt Kt = (1  t)P kt Kt 1 + P it It; (11)
where Kt is the real xed capital stock, It is the real gross xed capital
formation, P kt is the price of xed capital, P
i
t is the price of new xed capital
at time t and  is a time-varying average rate of depreciation. Note that a
further restatement of eq.(11) yields the following equation:
P kt Kt = (1  t)

P kt
P kt 1

P kt 1Kt 1 + P
i
t It (12)
Eq.(12) is similar to generalised perpetual inventory rule proposed by Shaikh
(2016:821). Let
 
1 + kt

=

Pkt
Pkt 1

, then the stock-ow accumulation rule
can be written as follows:
P kt Kt =

(1  0)
 
1 + k0
t
P k0K0 +
t 1X
j=0

(1  t j)
 
1 + kt j
j
P it jIt j;
(13)
where P k0K0 is the initial nomonal xed capital stock. For su¢ ciently long se-
ries of gross xed capital formation, it is clear that as long as (1  0)
 
1 + k0

<
1, then as n becomes large, the e¤ect of the initial value of the nominal xed
capital stock on the current nominal xed capital stock disappears. This
implies that the estimate of the nominal xed capital stock becomes less
sensitive to the choice of the initial value as the time series becomes long.
In order to operationalise eq.(13) I need a proxy for kt , t and P
k
0K0. For
kt , I will assume that this is the same as 
i
t, which means that the ratio
P it
Pkt

is constant. While we assume t =  to be a constant, we take kt
as time-varying as in the data. Regarding the initial nominal xed capital
stock, we follow Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and run a regression of the
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natural log of nominal gross xed capital investment on a constant and a
time trend. We then take the co-e¢ cient on the time trend and use it to
estimate the initial capital stock, on the basis of the following equation:
P k0K0 =
P i1I1
(1 + gI0) 

(1  )  1 + k0 ; (14)
where gI0 is the coe¢ cient of the time trend in the regression of the natural log
of gross xed capital investment on a constant and a time trend. Note that
eq.(14) is based on eq.(12). The regression results show that gI0 = 0:03:With
respect to the ination rate of the price index of the xed capital stock,
we calculate it to be k0 = 0:02. Therefore in order for the nominal xed
capital stock to converge, the requirement is that  > 0:02: We set the rate
of depreciation to be 0.0225, which makes the annual rate of depreciation
to be 0.09. As Shaikh (2016:846) illustrates, the e¤ect on the initial capital
stock dissipates over the long path as long as (1  )  1 + k0 < 1.
With these ingredients in hand, the estimate of the real xed capital stock
for the aggregate economy is depicted in Figure 2. As can be observed,
there was a slowdown in the accumulation of real xed capital from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s. Figure 2 also suggests that during this period there
was a crisis in a sense that there was no additional capital for purposes of
capitalist production. Prinsloo and Smith (1997) note that "a contributing
factor to the decline in the growth in real xed capital stock during the 1990s
is that the increase in gross xed investment fell short of the growth in the
depreciation allowance from 1989 to 1993". In Marxist terms, the crisis rate
of prot was above the actual rate of prot, i.e. r > r; the economy was
experiencing an overaccumulation crisis.
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Figure 2: Real xed capital stock
3.2. Empirical patterns of protability
The appropriate measurement of the rate of prot requires that prots be
measured using the same deator as that of the capital stock. This is im-
portant so as to remove the spurious e¤ect of the ratio between the price of
output and the price of capital. Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of the rate of
prot based on the estimated xed capital stock. The prole of the rate of
prot is consistent with the one found in other countries. In the 1970s the
rate of prot fell. The neoliberal period is characterised by the recovery of
the rate of prot from 1983 to 2006. Beyond 2006 the rate of prot declines,
leading up the great recession which began in 2008.
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Figure 3: The quarterly rate of prot (1960:1-2016:2)
Figure 4 illustrates the behaviour of capital intensity (capital-output ratio)
and the prot share in order to assess which of the components of the rate
of prot are responsible for its behaviour. We have used the 2010Q4 values,
which are 6.43 for the capital-output ratio and 0.495 for the prot share, as
base values. Between 1960Q1 and 1998Q4 the prot share remained fairly
constant, uctuating around 0.495. Thereafter the prot share rose sharply
in the early 2000s and started declining after 2007. On the other hand, from
the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, the capital-output ratio rose persistently.
It is therefore the increase in capital intensity which explains most of the
decline in the rate of prot between 1960 and 1984. This observation is
similar to the one made by Nattrass (1989).
During the neoliberal phase, the prot share remained fairly constant on
average, but the capital-output ratio fell. Once again the recovery of the
rate of prot over this period is largely explained by changes in the capital-
output ratio. From 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 the prot share remained constant
but the capital-output ratio continued to fall. During the great recession,
the economy experienced both the fall in the prot share and the increase in
capital intensity. The sharp increase in capital intensity at the onset of the
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great recession can be explained by the fact that the recession led to a sharp
drop in output, which led to a sharp increase in the capital-output ratio.
Figure 4: Capital intensity and the prot share (2010=1)
The conguration of the components of the rate of prot after 2010 is similar
to the one between 1982 and 1995. During this period, section 4 shows that
the South African economy experienced a crisis of absolute overproduction
of capital. The historical minimum rate of prot that prevailed in 1984Q1
was 6.6%, the same rate of prot prevailed in 2014Q4. Nevertheless there is
an important di¤erence between these two periods. During the crisis in the
1980s the prot share was slightly rising, i.e.



> 0. However during the
current crisis we have



< 0, i.e. the prot share is falling.
Lastly, we report the normal rate of prot, which removes the e¤ects of
capacity utilisation from the rate of prot. The normal rate of prot is
therefore the "long-run" rate of prot that would prevail if all capacity were
fully utilised. To estimate this rate of prot, we apply the same method as
Shaikh (2016: 826) to obtain the rate of capacity utilisation. We then divide
the rate of prot depicted in Figure 3 by this rate of capacity utilisation.
The results are depicted in Figure 5. Having controlled for uctuations in
capacity utilisation, it can be seen that the neoliberal recovery occurs in
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the early 1990s, corresponding to the beginning of the democratic period in
South Africa. The extent of the recovery did not lead to as high a peak in
the normal prot rate as in the 1960s.
Figure 5: The normal quarterly rate of prot (1960-2016)
Figures 3 and 5 also show that the South African rate of prot contains
a downward trend. There are two large shocks to the normal prot rate.
These two shocks are associated with a combination of conjunctural events.
The rst shock occurred between 1972 and 1976. In the beginning of 1972
there was an increase in the price of gold, which was one of the major exports
for the South African economy. However, as pointed out by Terreblanche
(2002: 305), in 1973 there was a strike, which depressed prots. In 1974
there was a coup in Portugal, which posed a serious threat to the apartheid
regime because this coup opened prospects for the independence of neigh-
bouring Mozambique and Angola. This served to depress the investment
environment, which was further depressed by the 1976 student uprisings.
The second shock in 1980 is due to the sharp increase in the gold price.
Furthermore, in 1980 there was an increase in workersstrikes, which also
decreased prots. Terreblanche (2002: 342) says that the number of strikes
and working days lost increased considerably from 1980 onwards and reached
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a new high point in 1982, when almost 400 strikes took place and 365 000
working days were lost. The sharp changes in the normal rate of prot
therefore correspond to conjunctural political events that characterise the
turbulence of the South African socio-economic formation. However, the un-
derlying trend in the rate of prot remained downwards, and this falling trend
in the rate of prot ultimately choked the growth of the mass of prots and,
as Prinsloo and Smith (1997) note, capital accumulation became insu¢ cient
to cover depreciation between 1989 and 1993.
4. Econometric evidence on cyclical crises
In this section, we provide econometric specications and estimations of the
equations that have been outlined in the theoretical framework. The relevant
equations to be estimated are eqs.(2), (5) and (9). We treat these equations
as expressing "long run" relations, so that our preferred estimation strategy
species lags of the dependent variable in order to capture the short-run
dynamic properties of the data. We begin with an econometric specication
of eq.(2), the rate of capital accumulation:
gkt = 1:63
(0:01)
gkt 1   0:66
(0:01)
gkt 2 + 0:06
(0:01)
rt 1   0:04
(0:02)
xt + 0:01
(0:03)
sgt   0:004
(0:00)
R
2
= 0:99, DW = 2:04; (15)
where gk =

K
K
is the annualised growth rate of real xed capital. In eq.(15) we
observe that the government budget surplus is not a statistically signicant
driver of the rate of capital accumulation. The rate of prot and the current
account balance play a signicant role. We can derive r by setting gkt = 0.
This yields a series of r, which is depicted by the dotted line in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Protability and the overproduction crisis (

K=0)
The rst shaded portion of the graph, which lies between 1983Q11988Q1,
shows the rst episode in the sample, where the economy experienced a crisis
of overproduction of capital. The second shaded portion also depicts a crisis
period between 1990Q21993Q1. The second shade corresponds to the period
where Smith and Prinsloo (1997) say "gross xed investment fell short of the
growth in the depreciation allowance". Figure 6 shows that the crisis of
stagnation in the rate of capital accumulation lasted for approximately 10
years, from 1983Q11993Q1.
The next crisis rate of prot that we derive is the one which is associated
with a stagnant mass of prots. In this connection, we specify and estimate
eq.(9) as follows:
gt = 0:44
(0:04)
gt 1 + 1:05
(0:07)
gt + 0:48
(0:22)
rt + 1:51
(0:69)
sgt   0:04
(0:39)
xt   0:03
(0:02)
R
2
= 0:80; DW = 1:33; (16)
where g =



and g =



are annualised growth rates. We observe that
the government budget surplus is statistically signicant while the current
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account is not signicant. The size of the coe¢ cient on the growth rate of
the prot share is 1.05, which is close the theoretical value of 1. We can
then derive r by casting eq.(16) in the long run and then setting the growth
rate of prots to zero. The result is illustrated in Figure 7. The rst crisis
of overproduction of capital in the sample period occurred between 1984Q1
1986Q3. The second crisis started in 2012Q4 and is still on-going. Note
that after 2015Q1 the crisis rate of prot began exceeding the actual rate of
prot, which means that during this period the mass of prots is in decline.
Figure 7: Protability and the overproduction crisis (

=0)
Looking at Figures 6 and 7, both the crisis rates of prot concur that the
South African economy experienced an overproduction of capital crisis in the
mid-1980s. It is precisely during this period that a major political turning
point occurred in the struggle against apartheid. The formation of the
anti-apartheid United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 was followed by the
formation of the trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU), in 1985. These major developments strengthened the
political opposition to apartheid, which culminated in the release of political
prisoners in the late 1980s and the ultimately the unbanning of the national
liberation movements in 1990.
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In a similar fashion, the current crisis, which in our framework began in
2012Q3, was also accompanied by some political changes and developments.
The rst important political development was the massacre of mineworkers
on the platinum mines of Marikana on 20 August 2012 by the state. This
was followed by the divisions in the Congress of South African Trade Unions,
which ultimately led to the expulsion of the second largest union in the coun-
try, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) in 2014
and the decision by the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) to leave the
trade union federation in 2016. Another development was the establishment
of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013, which is largely composed
of a breakaway from the ruling African National Congress (ANC). All these
developments were coupled with sharpening divisions within the ruling ANC,
and they contributed towards the poor electoral performance of the ANC in
the 2016 local government elections.
Lastly, it is important to check if the scope for the increase in capital intensity
still exists. If such a scope exists, then we expect the rate of prot to continue
falling below r, thereby deepening the crisis of overproduction of capital. If
the prot share also continues to fall and the decit on the current account
declines, then by eq.(10) r would increase, thus worsening the crisis. In
estimating eq.(5) we were confronted with a puzzle in that the sign on the
rate of prot was negative, instead of being positive. In order to get around
this problem, we estimate an econometric specication of eq.(4) in order
to derive the critical rate of capital accumulation that is consistent with a
stationary capital intensity. The econometric specication for eq.(4) is given
by:
gVt = 0:52
(0:07)
gVt 1 + 0:15
(0:07)
gVt 2 + 0:29
(0:08)
gkt   0:01
(0:00)
R
2
= 0:51; DW = 2:01; (17)
where gV =

V
V
is the annualised growth rate of capital intensity. By setting
gV = 0, we obtain the critical rate of capital accumulation to be gkc = 0:028,
at which capital intensity is stationary. The results are illustrated in Figure
8.
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Figure 7: The dynamics of capital intensity and the crisis
In the mid-1980s capital intensity stopped rising after 1985Q1, a year after
the crisis of overproduction of capital. Thereafter the rate of capital accumu-
lation plummeted and uctuated around zero. The overaccumulation crisis
lasted for roughly two years. While the current crisis of overproduction of
capital started at least from 2012Q3, there is still a substantially positive
rate of capital accumulation, which signals a much more prolonged overac-
cumulation crisis than in the 1980s. However since the crisis rate of prot
ultimately rose above the actual rate in 2015Q1, we expect that the rate of
capital accumulation would collapse sharply. In addition, since the rate of
capital accumulation remains slightly above the critical rate, we expect the
rate of prot to continue falling since capital intensity would rise slightly.
The prospects of a recovery in the light of this conguration of the rate of
capital accumulation and the rate of prot are therefore non-existent.
5. Policy responses to the crisis
Eqs.(6), (7) and (10) show that scal austerity measures will reduce the crit-
ical and crisis rates of prot. Given the actual rate of prot, this will lead
to a recovery in the mass of prots and in the rate of capital accumulation.
Econometric evidence from eqs.(15) and (16) suggests that scal policy is
more e¤ective in driving the growth rate of the mass of prots than it is in
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driving the rate of capital accumulation. Therefore the crisis of overaccu-
mulation cannot be e¤ectively tackled using scal policy, however the crisis
of overproduction of capital, the need to raise the mass of prots, can be
e¤ectively tackled using scal policy. Fiscal austerity would however mean
that public spending on meeting the needs of the working class may have to
be curtailed, which may lead to a political crisis.
It should be noted that scal austerity measures are contradictory, because
they also reduce the critical rate of prot below the actual rate, which soon
leads to an increase in capital intensity and puts downward pressure on the
rate of prot. This dynamic may explain the observation made by Tsoul-
dis et al.(2016) in the context of Greece. These authors state that "after
ve years of relentless austerity, the Greek economy is far from recovering.
Contrary to the stated aims of the austerity package, the Greek economy
remains trapped in a debt-deation spiral that has precipitated the collapse
of its productive base".
As part of the package to get out of the crisis, Tsouldis et al.(2016) pro-
pose that Greece "focuses on the revitalization of economic activity through
demand-side polices, as well as institutional, industrial and banking sector
reforms". From the standpoint of scal policy such measures would entail an
expansionary scal stance. Decit spending would prevent capital intensity
from rising, which would facilitate a recovery in the rate of prot given the
prot share. However decit spending would raise the crisis rates of prot.
Overall the mass of prots and the rate of capital accumulation will not re-
cover. In the light of this, the tax base will not grow and the public sector
is likely to be in a debt-trap.
An alternative is to adopt measures that directly a¤ect the current account.
What is clear from the equations is that a current account decit would re-
duce the crisis rates of prot. The econometric evidence suggests that current
account oriented policies will likely be more e¤ective in tackling the overac-
cumulation crisis than the crisis of overproduction of capital. Therefore
policies that promote current account decits will ease the crisis. However
such policies are not sustainable, because persistent decits on the current
account will lead to an increase in foreign debt and ultimately, a balance of
payments crisis.
The mechanism by which the mass of prots can recover without bringing
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to the fore the contradictory e¤ects that we have outlined is to increase the
prot share. This can be achieved, as Marx (Capital III: Chapter XIV)
notes, by either suppressing the real wage below the value of labour power,
increasing the intensity of exploitation, and increasing relative overpopula-
tion (unemployment) all of which are linked to the weakening of worker mil-
itancy. The more direct political intervention would be to weaken working
class organisations, especially progressive trade unions. If some measure of
decit on the current account is to be accommodated, it should be due to the
importation of cheaper elements of constant and variable capital. However
if a surplus on the current account is maintained during the crisis, it should
be that economies of scale exist and are su¢ ciently exploited to reduce unit
costs, while expanding production.
6. Conclusion
The South African economy is characterised by a number of challenges, key
of which are high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality. A series
of studies, expert panels and commissions have been undertaken with a view
to provide long-lasting solutions to these challenges. To date, none of these
initiatives have borne any tangible results. While there is a general view
that this lack of results is due to governments inability to implement rec-
ommendations and policies, there has been very little consideration of the
role of protability in constraining and relaxing the parameters of successful
state intervention within the logic of the capitalist mode of production.
This paper proceeds from a Marxist perspective in order to identify the phase
changes of capitalist accumulation in the South African economy. By con-
structing a new series of the quarterly xed capital stock, we estimate an
appropriately deated quarterly rate of prot of the South African economy
and nd that the rate of prot displays a tendency to fall in a cyclical man-
ner. This tendency is more striking for the normal rate of prot, which
controls for uctuations in capacity utilisation. The main driver of the rate
of prot to fall is the tendency of capital intensity to rise.
We also derive time varying rates of prot which correspond to stationary
capital intensity, zero capital accumulation and stagnant mass of prots.
Consistent with other international studies cited by Tsouldis and tsaliki
(2014), we nd that the period of the mid-1980s constitutes a phase change
in the path of capital accumulation in South Africa. In relation to the current
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crisis, we identify the period after 2012Q3 to constitute a phase change in
capital accumulation. However two di¤erences stand out between the current
phase change and the one on the 1980s.
Firstly, during the 1980s crisis, the prot share was rising whereas during
the current crisis, the prot share is falling. Secondly in the 1980s, the econ-
omy experienced the "overaccumulation crisis" between 1982Q4 and 1987Q2,
which is almost ve years. During the current crisis, the economy has already
entered its overaccumulation phase for almost four years. Yet, despite the
continuing stagnation in the mass of prots, the gap between the actual prot
rate and the rate of prot that is consistent with a halt in capital accumu-
lation remains large. We thus conclude that, unless the prot share rises,
which is unlikely to happen without class struggles, the crisis of overaccumu-
lation will continue until the actual prot rate has fallen to the level where
capital accumulation grinds to a halt. This dims the growth prospects of the
South African economy.
Our theoretical framework suggests that scal austerity measures would re-
duce the crisis rate of prot and permit the recovery in both the mass of
prot and the rate of capital accumulation. However such measures would
also reduce the critical rate of prot, which will permit the increase in capi-
tal intensity. Since the increase in capital intensity puts downward pressure
on the rate prot, the economy would once again experience a fall in prof-
itability. The other alternative is to adopt expansionary scal policy through
decit spending. However this alternative has its own limits. It will raise
the crisis rates of prot, sink the economy deeper into crisis and raise public
debt. The other option is to allow for imports to cheapen the elements of
constant capital and the value of labour power, which would worsen the cur-
rent account balance. This option too is not sustainable, since it may lead
to foreign debt crisis.
It therefore appears that for the economy to resolve the current crisis on
the capitalist basis, measures that raise the prot share and a slowdown in
the accumulation process would be necessary to decrease the crisis rates of
prot and to support the recovery of the rate of prot. Such measures would
entail an attack on the working class. The slowdown in the rate of capital
accumulation would increase the unemployment rate, which would suppress
the growth rate of real wages below the value of labour power.
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